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Continental	Breakfast	6:	Is	Switzerland	a	model	for	the
UK-EU	relationship?
The	Swiss	ambassador	to	the	UK	joined	experts	in	the	field	at	the	LSE	on	6
December	to	discuss	the	pros	and	cons	of	the	Swiss	model	as	a	frame	for
Britain’s	future	relationship	with	the	EU.	Diane	Bolet	(LSE)	reports	on	the	key
points	of	the	discussion,	which	was	held	under	Chatham	House	rules.	The	Swiss
model	is	instructive	for	the	UK	–	but	perhaps	chiefly	because	of	its	inherent
problems	and	unsuitability	for	the	UK.
Switzerland	enjoys	a	unique	relationship	with	the	EU,	taking	part	in	the	European
Free	Trade	Association	(EFTA)	without	being	a	member	of	the	European
Economic	Area	(EEA).	While	adopting	the	Swiss	model	may	prove	incompatible
with	some	of	the	UK’s	priorities,	reflecting	on	the	EU-Swiss	relations	might
provide	useful	pointers	for	the	way	the	UK	negotiates	with	the	EU.
How	does	the	Swiss	model	fit	in	the	options	on
the	table	for	the	UK	deal?
Switzerland’s	relationship	with	the	EU	was	not	built	in	a	day,	but	has	evolved	over	the	years	in	long	rounds	of
bilateral	negotiations.	The	Free	Trade	Agreement	(FTA)	signed	in	1972	marked	the	start	of	an	organic	development
of	sector-by-sector	membership	of	the	Single	Market.	More	than	120	agreements	have	covered	a	variety	of	sectors.
They	range	from	the	Dublin	regulation,	which	specifies	humanitarian	standards	regarding	asylum	seekers,	to
Schengen	Accords,	which	removed	border	patrols	between	Switzerland	and	the	EU.	On	a	spectrum	of	post-Brexit
negotiating	scenarios,	the	Swiss	way	would	be	situated	close	to	the	soft	Norwegian-style	option,	just	above	a
‘Comprehensive	Economic	and	Trade	Agreement	Plus’	(CETA+)	option	that	would	resemble	the	EU-Korea	FTA	with
more	services	provision.
The	‘Swiss	way’	has	some	merits.	It	enables	flexible	and	tailor-made	agreements	to	be	made	and	potentially
modified	in	the	future.	It	is	founded	on	a	nuclear	option	in	the	spirit	of	Delors’	co-decision	procedures,	which	requires
that	if	one	agreement	is	breached,	then	all	are	breached	(‘Tous	l’acquis,	rien	que	l’acquis’).	Each	bespoke,	modular
agreement	is	subject	to	scrutiny	in	a	joint	committee	that	ensures	it	is	transposed	into	Swiss	law	in	compliance	with
the	EU	law	(‘autonomer	Nachvollzug’)	so	that	the	integrity	of	the	single	market	is	protected	(‘Verträglichkeitsprüfung’).
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However,	those	joint	committees	only	meet	once	a	year	and	are	generally	not	able	to	take	decisions	by	themselves.	
As	Switzerland	is	under	no	legal	obligation	to	take	on	new	EU	legislation,	some	legal	disputes	about	new	agreements
or	amendments	can	arise	and	remain	unresolved.	The	fact	that	all	agreements	of	a	negotiation	need	to	be	approved,
known	as	the	guillotine	provision,	has	contributed	to	stalemate	situations.
Yet	the	‘Swiss	way’	is	considered	too	restrictive	by	the	EU	and	the	UK,	for	several	reasons.
Drawbacks	and	difficulties	for	the	EU
The	EU	feels	Switzerland	is	cherry-picking	without	fulfilling	membership	obligations	and	accepting	ECJ	jurisdictions.
Unlike	for	countries	in	the	EEA	which	have	to	directly	apply	the	EU	rules	without	having	a	say,	the	Switzerland-EU
relations	entail	ongoing	and	continuous	negotiations	that	need	to	be	reached	by	both	parties.	This	causes	legal
disputes	in	case	of	disagreement,	for	which	the	judicial	framework	is	not	entirely	clear.	De	jure,	the	Court	of	Justice	of
the	European	Free	Trade	Association	States	plays	a	role	in	resolving	disputes,	but	de	facto,	the	EFTA	court
‘shadows’	interpretations	of	the	European	Court	of	Justice	(ECJ).	Not	only	are	the	EFTA’s	Court	Statute	and	its
Rules	of	Procedure	modelled	on	those	of	the	ECJ,	but	the	EFTA	Court	follows	ECJ	case	law	as	a	rule	(law	on	the
books).	The	judgments	in	Norway,	Liechtenstein	and	Iceland,	the	non-EU	members	who	belong	to	the	EFTA	court,
carry	the	same	force	as	the	preliminary	rulings	rendered	by	the	ECJ	under	Article	267	TFEU.
As	such,	a	move	out	of	the	EU	and	into	the	EEA	implies	a	subjugation	of	national	sovereignty,	since	members	lose
their	representation	in	all	the	EU	law-making	bodies,	but	remain	subject	to	the	laws.	The	EU	would,	however,	prefer
to	maintain	a	level	playing	field	with	the	UK	–	as	it	does	with	the	EEA	countries	–	rather	than	the	sort	of	relationship	it
has	with	Switzerland.	The	latter’	undertaking	to	“autonomously	copy	EU	law”	results	in	perpetual	dispute,	often
followed	by	threats	of	trade	restrictions	and	eventually	by	Swiss	acquiescence.
If	any	legal	dispute	occurs	between	an	EU	country	and	Switzerland,	the	ECJ	can	only	intervene	when	there	is	a
clash	between	Swiss	law	and	EU	law.	The	ECJ	is	therefore	powerless	to	act	when	there	is	no	Swiss	law
corresponding	to	the	EU	law,	which	can	lead	to	situations	where	Swiss	companies	are	operating	within	the	Single
Market	but	are	not	bound	by	its	rules.	This	is	the	heart	of	the	problem.	The	‘Swiss	way’	is	considered	an	inflexible
tool	in	which	‘à	la	carte’	agreements	are	inevitably	problematic	for	the	EU.
Therefore,	the	EU	proposes	a	more	binary	choice	for	the	UK	of	either	CETA	or	European	Economic	Area	(EEA)
types,	because	they	fit	better	into	existing	structures.	CETA	covers	some	services,	some	regulatory	equivalence	and
disputes	resolution	mechanisms	without	having	the	extensive	mutual	recognition,	monitoring	and	sanctions	of	a
‘CETA	Plus’	agreement.	The	EEA	is	relatively	easy	for	the	EU,	as	states	have	to	apply	the	whole	EU	acquis	and	no
new	agreements	are	needed	if	the	EU	changes	its	regulatory	architecture.
Drawbacks	and	difficulties	for	the	UK
One	important	drawback	to	adopting	the	Swiss	model	for	the	UK	is	the	obligation	to	fulfil	the	fourth	pillar	of	the	single
market	if	it	still	wants	to	be	part	of	it	–	the	free	movement	of	persons.	After	Switzerland	initially	restricted	freedom	of
movement	of	people,	the	EU	immediately	sanctioned	it	by	limiting	its	university	partnerships	with	the	EU	like
HORIZON	2020.	This	eventually	prompted	Switzerland	to	temper	the	law	to	bring	it	in	line	with	the	EU	legislation.
This	seems	unacceptable	from	the	British	point	of	view,	since	one	of	the	main	driving	forces	for	Brexit	was	the	desire
to	control	immigration.
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Another	major	incompatibility	with	the	Swiss	model	is	the	fact	that	it	does	not	cover	financial	services.	Financial
services	‘passporting’	is	not	part	of	the	Swiss	agreement,	partly	because	of	an	initial	Swiss	desire	to	retain	their
banking	secrecy	rules.	However,	having	since	been	forced	to	become	more	transparent,	some	Swiss	banks	pressed
for	access	to	the	single	market,	and	finance	is	currently	part	of	the	negotiations	of	the	third	package.	In	spite	of	the
high	degree	of	convergence	between	Switzerland	and	the	EU,	the	financial	services	deal	seems	to	be	running	into
the	sand.	The	deal	was	originally	conceived	at	a	time	that	Switzerland	seemed	to	be	moving	towards	full
membership,	but	as	that	prospect	has	receded,	the	EU	has	become	less	willing	to	extend	a	key	market	access	within
a	bilateral	framework	in	which	they	are	not	comfortable.	Furthermore,	the	required	regulatory	convergence	is
currently	a	source	of	political	disagreements	in	Switzerland.	As	such,	the	Swiss	financial	sector’s	access	to	the
Single	Market	is	restricted,	leaving	it	at	a	competitive	disadvantage.	Since	financial	services	is	the	UK’s	largest
export	sector	and	almost	5,500	UK	firms	rely	on	corporate	‘passports’	to	do	business	with	other	EU	companies,	it
seems	unlikely	that	the	UK	would	favour	such	a	model.
The	sovereignty	issue	represents	the	most	fundamental	difficulty	for	the	UK	in	adopting	the	Swiss	way,	especially
because	it	constituted	the	strongest	argument	in	the	Leave	campaign.	Despite	originally	refusing	to	be	part	of	the
EEA	on	sovereignty	grounds,	Switzerland	has	found	itself	obliged	to	apply	de	facto	EU	laws	in	each	negotiation	of	its
bilateral	sectors.	As	mentioned	above,	one	example	is	the	rejection	of	quotas	on	EU	workers	by	the	Swiss
Parliament,	overturning	the	results	of	a	2014	referendum.	The	parliament	opted	instead	to	give	residents	priority	in
new	job	vacancies.	This	U-turn	was	mostly	taken	to	comply	with	EU	law	and	keep	access	to	the	Single	Market.	
Since	the	EU	is	its	biggest	trading	partner	and	it	cannot	afford	to	put	that	trade	at	risk	by	falling	foul	of	their	package
agreements,	Switzerland	has	no	choice	but	to	adapt	to	the	EU	product	standards	to	sell	products.	As	a	result,	it	is	a
mistake	to	think	Switzerland	does	not	have	to	follow	EU	directives.	For	a	European	country	outside	the	Union	to
trade	with	the	rest	of	Europe,	it	must	abide	by	EU	regulations.	The	House	of	Commons	Foreign	Affairs	Committee
reported	that	the	best	way	to	have	an	effective	say	in	the	way	the	UK’s	tradable	economy	is	regulated	is	to	remain
inside	the	Union.
The	Swiss	way	represents	too	many	compromises	for	the	UK	–	yet	not	enough	to	satisfy	the	EU	that	the	UK	would
not	undermine	the	rules	of	the	Single	Market.	As	a	result,	some	people	expect	that	the	UK	is	likely	to	end	up	with	a
limited	FTA,	‘CETA	minus’	because
i)	there	is	not	enough	time;
ii)	the	EU	is	not	willing	to	accept	an	extensive	services	agreement;
iii)	the	EU	will	be	satisfied	with	a	limited		agreement	on	trade	given	that	the	UK	sells	services	to	the	EU	and	the	EU
sells	goods	to	the	UK,
iv)	an	extensive	trade	agreement	will	be	hard	to	ratify	by	all	EU27	countries;
and	v)	for	the	UK	it	is	better	than	nothing.
That	said,	what	aspects	of	the	Swiss	Model	could	be	adapted	to	the	UK?
The	way	Switzerland	has	managed	customs	checks	with	the	EU	customs	security,	cooperation	and	facilitation	area
could	be	relevant	for	the	UK.	Implemented	in	1990	and	revised	in	2009,	this	landmark	agreement	has	led	to	very
close	convergence	between	the	EU	and	Switzerland	with	regard	to	facilitating	goods	transit.	Despite	regulatory
convergence,	there	are	still	customs	checks	of	EU	goods	in	Switzerland.	However,	goods	arriving	or	transiting	from
EU	and	non-EU	countries	do	not	require	extra	checks	by	Switzerland	since	they	are	assumed	to	have	been
controlled	by	the	EU	countries.
The	Swiss	model	is	particularly	instructive	for	the	UK	in	the	medium-term	after	the	transition	period.	Although	the	UK
might	come	out	of	its	exit	negotiation	deal	with	a	relatively	limited	FTA,	negotiations	with	the	EU	will	carry	on.	The
UK/EU	relationship	will	remain	a	permanent	feature	of	both	domestic	and	foreign	politics	in	Britain.	Many	people
seem	to	agree	that	the	medium-term	architecture	of	the	UK-EU	relationship	in	the	next	10-15	years	should	already
be	being	worked	out,	in	spite	of	the	lack	of	discussions	on	the	matter	in	the	British	Parliament	and	among	the	party
leaderships.
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The	way	Switzerland	started	from	an	initial	agreement	and	has	gradually	‘bolted	on’	bilateral	agreements	by	sectors
is	therefore	interesting	to	consider.	The	UK	could	potentially	look	like	the	Swiss	model	with	decision-making
archetypes	similar	to	the	EEA	and	Delors’	co-decision	procedures	or	Bruegel’s	‘Continental	Partnership’.	The	latter	is
a	new	form	of	collaboration	that	would	include	continued	partnership	in	terms	of	the	free	movement	of	goods,
services	and	capital	with	limited	labour	mobility	(Bruegel,	2016).	This	new	inter-governmental	system	would
guarantee	decision	making	and	implementation	of	regulations	in	line	with	the	EU	Single	Market	ones.	It	would	also
allow	closer	cooperation	in	foreign	policy,	security	and	defence.	Once	the	trade	agreement	has	been	signed,	the	two
parties	will	bolt	on	various	aspects	of	trade,	economic	and	social	policies.	This	may	include	expanding	creative
industries	with	the	MEDIA	programme,	enlarging	the	academic	field	with	HORIZON	2020	and	ERASMUS
programmes,	sharing	data	to	guarantee	security	and	protection,	as	well	as	creating	an	EU-UK	common	arrest
warrant	and	judicial	cooperation	to	combat	terrorism	or	an	EU-UK	‘Blue	Card’	for	skilled	workers.
Conducting	the	negotiations:	lessons	to	learn	from	the	Swiss	model
While	the	Swiss	model	might	be	difficult	to	implement,	there	are	many	lessons	to	learn	from	it.
Institutional	difficulties	and	problems	of	divergence
The	13	years	of	negotiations	on	the	third	package,	in	particular	in	relation	to	financial	services,	highlight	the
institutional	difficulties	and	problems	of	divergence	that	Switzerland	faces	with	the	EU.	The	EU	wants	the	ECJ	to
have	jurisdiction	to	ensure	that	the	integrity	of	the	Single	Market	law	is	safeguarded,	not	Switzerland.	But	to	what
extent	is	the	UK	willing	to	converge	or	diverge	with	the	EU?	A	key	element	of	the	campaign	for	the	UK	to	leave	the
EU	was	to	free	itself	from	EU	regulations,	whereas	Switzerland	leans	towards	regulatory	convergence.
Danger	of	spurring	anti-Europeanism
Some	people	worry	about	the	risk	of	increasing	anti-Europeanism	in	the	UK	as	almost	every	aspect	of	government
policy	affecting	market	conditions	has	to	be	negotiated	with	the	EU,	casting	the	EU	in	the	perpetual	role	of	an
obstacle	or	opponent.	Following	the	1992	referendum	that	saw	Switzerland	very	narrowly	rejecting	membership	of
the	EEA,	political	resentment	towards	the	EU	has	steadily	increased,	and	recent	polls	show	that	support	for
membership	has	fallen	to	11%.	This	could	be	particularly	worrying	for	political	stability	in	the	UK,	as	the	UK	is
perhaps	less	immune	to	political	turmoil	than	the	remarkably	stable	Swiss	system.
Asymmetrical	power	dynamics
Dealing	with	the	EU	requires	an	understanding	of	the	power	dynamics	between	the	EU	and	Switzerland	that	rest	on
asymmetry.	Since	the	EU	considers	itself	a	political	community	with	its	own	sets	of	principles	and	rules,	it	puts	its
principles	first	and	becomes	inflexible.	Every	time	the	EU	changes	any	law,	it	is	up	to	Switzerland	to	converge	to	that
law	domestically,	not	the	other	way	round.	Some	have	described	the	relationship	in	terms	of	the	EU	‘putting’	non-EU
countries	in	a	special	‘pillar’	with	limited	room	for	manoeuvre.	This	may	pose	the	risk	of	becoming	a	satellite	state,
just	like	Puerto	Rico	is	to	the	United	States.	EEA	members	and	Switzerland	have	become	‘satellites’	with	no
institutional	representation,	unrepresented	in	the	Delors’	co-decision	procedures	where	institutional	legislation	was
approved	by	both	the	Council	and	the	Parliament.	The	UK	would	benefit	from	recognising	that	it	faces	a	stark	choice
between	open	access	to	the	Single	Market,	and	gaining	the	autonomy	to	regulate	its	own	economy.		A	failure	to
recognise	this	would	be	likely	to	lead	to	continual	disputes	with	an	inflexible	EU	making	threats	of	trade	restrictions,
followed	by	humiliating	climbdowns.
The	same	goes	for	financial	contributions	to	the	EU.	They	may	continue	as	long	as	they	remain	compatible	and
converge	with	the	EU	requirements.	In	the	Swiss	case,	cohesion	funds	for	projects	driven	by	Switzerland	for	EU
recipients	that	are	considered	priority	areas	have	been	conducted.	Whereas	this	asymmetric	relationship	is	well-
accepted	in	Switzerland,	it	seems	a	harder	sell	for	the	UK.	One	can	hardly	imagine	a	permanent	UK	commitment	to
pay	generally	to	the	EU,	even	if	the	UK	has	some	say	over	the	nature	of	the	project.	The	UK	might,	however,	accept
making	payments	that	will	be	mutually	beneficial,	such	as	paying	to	be	part	of	HORIZON	2020.
No	other	treaties	will	replace	the	Single	Market
LSE Brexit: Continental Breakfast 6: Is Switzerland a model for the UK-EU relationship? Page 4 of 5
	
	
Date originally posted: 2018-01-29
Permalink: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/2018/01/29/continental-breakfast-6-is-switzerland-a-model-for-the-uk-eu-relationship/
Blog homepage: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/
The	UK	needs	to	‘realise’	that	no	other	treaties	will	be	a	substitute	for	full	membership	of	the	Single	Market.	To	avoid
disparity	with	the	EU,	the	Swiss	free-trade	FTAs	with	third	countries	are	completed	after	deals	are	signed	between
these	third	countries	and	the	EU,	such	that	Switzerland	operates	as	a	sort	of	‘manual’	rather	than	automatic	member
of	the	single	market.	There	are	some	exceptions	to	this	rule,	as	shown	with	the	deal	with	China.	Yet	such	substantive
mutual	agreements	are	not	substitutes	for	the	FTA	of	the	EU.	Given	how	asymmetric	the	Swiss	bargaining	power
was,	the	Swiss	were	surprised	to	get	such	a	favourable	deal	with	China,	but	the	Chinese	afterwards	explained	that
their	motivation	was	that	they	meant	to	create	a	blueprint	for	their	much	more	important	agreement	with	the	EU.
Moreover,	the	EU	is	Switzerland’s	largest	trading	partner	and	any	other	agreements	with	large	countries	remain
secondary.	For	instance,	due	to	geographical	closeness,	Swiss	trade	with	Lombardi	is	more	important	than	trade	with
China	and	their	trade	with	Tyrol	is	twice	as	significant	as	that	with	Russia.	The	UK	perhaps	needs	to	recognise	that
such	agreements	are	only	complementary	and	could	not	compensate	for	the	loss	of	leaving	the	Single	Market.
As	for	the	desire	to	further	expand	new	areas	of	agreements	between	the	UK	and	Switzerland,	a	financial	services
deal	may	prove	difficult	because	they	are	competitors	and	Switzerland	would	not	like	to	provoke	Brussels.
In	a	nutshell,	the	Swiss	model	is	instructive	for	the	UK,	but	perhaps	as	much	because	of	its	inherent	problems	and	its
unsuitability	for	the	UK	rather	than	as	a	blueprint	for	a	future	UK-EU	relationship.
For	a	longer	version	of	this	post	with	footnotes	and	references,	see	this	report.	
This	post	represents	the	views	of	the	author	and	not	those	of	the	Brexit	blog,	nor	the	LSE.
Diane	Bolet	is	an	ESRC-funded	second	year	PhD	candidate	in	European	Studies	at	the	LSE,	researching	on	local
factors	behind	voting	behaviour	and	on	far-right	votes	in	particular.	
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